July 2024: Russia analysis
New Eurasian Strategies Centre Bulletin
Index
Is Russia really planning to block YouTube?
Even if the Russian authorities wanted to do this, implementing the policy would be difficult technically. In any case, it’s by no means certain that there would be a real justification for it.
Tax reform: a reflection of Putin’s fears
With a low debt burden and a significant amount of money in the system, Russia could easily increase its liabilities; but the authorities have decided that it’s better to make the population pay for the war.
The Theatre Case: six years in a penal colony as a performance act
Why the case against Yevgeniya Berkovich and Svetlana Petriychuk hasn’t caused any real protest in society.
Russia’s Asian diplomacy is becoming more complicated
How Narendra Modi’s unexpected visit to Moscow was linked to the summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that took place a few days earlier.
Sergei Lavrov addresses the Global South and the Middle East
Russia’s veteran Foreign Minister was in New York to address the UN Security Council. His real audience was elsewhere.
News in brief
Ukrainian Foreign Minister’s visit to China.
Kamala Harris joins the race for the White House.
Is YouTube being blocked or censored in Russia?
How likely is it that Russians will be deprived of the most popular channel for receiving content from the opposition?
Events
— YouTube is under attack in Russia. On 12 July Rostelecom, the largest
Internet provider in Russia and owner of the country’s fibre-optic lines, warned that the quality of the content reaching the end user could deteriorate. This was for technical reasons, the company said: Google, the owner of YouTube,
was not updating the local servers necessary for faster video downloading.
— On 24 July Rostelecom announced that this slow-down had started, once again blaming the poor state of Google’s equipment.
— The next day, Alexander Khinshtein, Chairman of the Duma Committee for Information Policy and Communications (i.e. the person responsible for the Internet and specifically YouTube), elaborated that this was due not so much to technical problems as to the video hosting organisation’s anti-Russian stance.
— Khinshtein said that YouTube would be deliberately slowed down
over the next two weeks by 40-70% because it was blocking content from politicians and propagandists loyal to the Russian authorities. At first,
the slowdown would only affect the desktop version and occur in the provinces.
Details
It’s true that Google has not updated its equipment for over two years.
The company is banned from doing so by US sanctions. Google did, however, propose a temporary technical solution which would provide content of reasonable quality. Some providers have accepted this proposal.
Khinshtein’s justification for the new policy was the need to prevent
‘the degradation of YouTube’. He said the platform should stop its anti-Russian propaganda (that is, stop blocking Russian propagandists) and update its equipment. He suggested that the sanctions problem could be solved either by Google making payments (illegal ones), or by getting the sanctions removed through political channels.
on Information Policy, Information Technologies, and Communications
As YouTube began to slow down on 25 July, Russian users found that
they were having problems with their banking apps and with the VK and Discord social media networks. The Central Bank’s rapid payments system, which allows citizens to make commission-free payments using the recipient’s telephone number, stopped working. Russia is the fifth-largest user of YouTube globally, with 78 percent of Russians – over 100 million people – using the platform each month.
According to various sources, more than 75% Russian YouTube viewing is entertainment – not political or news. Subscribers watching information content are way down the list. Yury Dud’s channel, ‘vDud’, has 10.8 million subscribers. The channels ‘Alexey Navalny’ and ‘Navalny Live’ have around 10 million. ‘Dozhd’ has approximately 5 million subscribers, and ‘Radio Liberty’ – 4.5 million. Of the propagandists’ channels, ‘Rossiya-24’ has about 9 million subscribers, followed by ‘The First Channel’ with 7.8 million and, across two channels, Vladimir Solovev with 3 million.
Competition to YouTube in Russian-language content comes from the home- grown copy, Rutube, and the social media network, ‘Vkontakte’. [Rutube was launched to encourage Russian content to be placed there, rather than on YouTube; Vkontakte (literally, ‘In contact’) was one of the first Russian social media sites, designed to help people re-establish contact with old school friends, etc.]
Rutube has relaunched several times. It claims to have a monthly audience of nearly 50 million people (half of YouTube’s Russian viewers);
but the number of actual subscribers indicates otherwise: the most positive estimates suggest fewer than 500,000.
The monthly audience for ‘VK video’ is 65 million, according to the channel’s own figures. It’s a long way behind YouTube’s 100 million and it’s impossible to confirm the number of video service subscribers.
Analysis
Almost from the time that Russia launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, YouTube was obliged to block Russian state media accounts to comply with sanctions regulations. This particularly affected ones loyal to the state and backed by churches (in other words, quasi-state accounts), such as RT, Sputnik, RBK, Spas and others.
In retaliation, telecoms and media regulator Roskomnadzor began to block foreign sites from being viewed in Russia. The idea of blocking – or banning – YouTube completely was first raised in March 2022, when Maria Zakharova, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, announced that the platform had signed its own death warrant, and advised Russians to download their favourite videos as soon as possible.
YouTube then blocked the accounts of the rappers, Legalize (who were opposed to the war) and one opposition account, kamikadze_d.
The blocking of YouTube was raised again at the start of 2023 by the former head of Roskomnadzor, and now Director General of Gazprom Media,
Alexander Zharov, as well as by then head of the ‘Wagner’ private military company, Yevgeny Prigozhin.
But they met with opposition, such as from the Director of the Mosfilm Studios, Karen Shakhnazarov, who stated what was effectively the official position: YouTube can be useful for state propaganda, too, so there is no need to ban it.
In particular, YouTube gives rabid supporters of the ‘Russian world’ theory
and similar extremists the opportunity to speak out and gain popularity, which creates a useful contrast for the authorities, who appear moderate by contrast.
By September 2023 Khinshtein suggested YouTube should not be blocked while no alternative was available; the new head of Roskomnadzor, Andrei Lipov, proposed that a balance should be found between the Russian Internet servers and YouTube; and the Russian Minister for Digital Development, Maksut Shadayev, confirmed that blocking YouTube was not on the agenda.
In 2024 YouTube has continued to block official and pro-government Russian accounts, in line with sanctions. These have included regional TV companies from the state broadcasting holding VGTRK; the film director Nikita Mikhalkov and his extremely politically incorrect programme ‘Besogon’; and several patriotic pop singers.
But YouTube also blocked accounts with opposition content at the request
of the Russian authorities. This includes the many accounts carrying advice on how to avoid being called up into the Russian army, and the human rights channel, ‘OVD-info’.
At the start of 2024 Vera Jourova, the Vice President of the European Commission, called for Google to do the impossible: to help independent Russian and Belarusian media do battle with the propagandists who were using the advantages of YouTube’s search algorithms.
On 12 July the online newspaper Gazeta.ru quoted a warning from an anonymous Kremlin source saying:
YouTube will continue to degrade throughout July and August,
and in certain regions, the way in which it operates will become worse and worse. In some areas this means it will operate more slowly, in others it will be interrupted, and in some places the app will crash. And in September it will begin to be blocked.
Significance
Banning or blocking YouTube would be a turning point on the road
to full information dictatorship. The Kremlin understands that the majority of YouTube users rely on it for entertainment or other non-political information such as cooking recipes.
Undoubtedly, there are political reasons for making YouTube slower to download, and this would be a way of testing how Russians might react, were YouTube to be blocked. A Kremlin insider has revealed two positions which are currently being considered in the corridors of power:
— If the whole of YouTube were blocked and most users switched to Rutube and videos on ‘Vkontakte’, it would send a powerful signal about
Russia’s ability to create its own version of something previously imported.
— The authorities could decide not to block, but to act according to the law
and seek court decisions to block unwanted and unblock loyal YouTube channels (of course, it’s simple for the Russian authorities to achieve their desired court decisions).
Each of these approaches has been tried and tested on other popular resources:
The ‘total’ block put on Facebook and Instagram did not produce the desired result. Russians who didn’t want to give up these social media sites found technical ways to get round the ban.
Khinshtein’s own wife is still a significant influencer on Instagram. What’s more, if the authorities chose to go down this route they would also have to fight against VPNs, which would be an exceedingly difficult task.
The tactic of slowing down an app was used against Twitter (now X) and
led to outages on other related but important resources, such as Microsoft.com. To some extent, the tactic worked. Twitter deleted more than 90% of the content as demanded by Roskomnadzor and came to an agreement with the authorities.
Another example is the fight with Telegram. There was no actual block
put on it, but a mutual understanding was reached, which some observers view as a political agreement between the regime and Pavel Durov, the owner of Telegram.
Previous experience suggests that a block on YouTube is less likely than a private agreement on its use.
A key factor for the Kremlin is that for many Russian citizens YouTube effectively replaces television as a source of entertainment. It would be
a dangerous step to remove it.
Tax reform:a reflection of Putin’s fears
Citizens, not the government, will pay for the war
Event
— The State Duma passed it; the Federation Council approved it;
and Vladimir Putin signed the law which increases the tax burden on Russian citizens and businesses.
— The Finance Ministry reckons that this reform will add more
than RUB 17 trillion ($196 billion) to the national budget by 2030.
Details
The amount of income tax which individuals will pay increases
on a sliding scale. Those who earn up to RUB 2.4 million ($27,700) a year
will pay 13%. Up to RUB 5 million ($57,800) total earnings, a 15% rate will kick in over RUB 2.4 million.
People earning up to RUB 20 million ($230,000) annually, will pay 18%
on the sum above RUB 5 million. Earnings up to RUB 50 million ($565,000) will incur 20% on the amount over RUB 20 million. And those who earn over RUB 50 million will pay 22% on the amount over RUB 50 million.
The Finance Ministry estimates that this will bring in over RUB 500 billion (around $6 billion) in the first year, and in the period up to 2030 it will add RUB 3.1 trillion (around $35 billion) to the state budget. The average rate of income tax will be 14.5%.
The tax on profits has gone up, too, from the previous 20% to 25%, thus adding RUB 1.6 trillion ($18 billion) in 2025 and RUB 11.1 trillion ($12.4 billion)by 2030.
The tax on the extraction of certain minerals is also rising, for example iron ore, potassium and phosphorus salts; and an excise tax is being introduced on gas used to produce ammonia (the raw material for mineral fertilisers).
Other new excise taxes are being brought in, on both nicotine-based and nicotine- free smoking products, and medicines containing alcohol. The system for calculating fees to the government for real estate transactions is changing, from a fixed fee to a share of the value of the property. The authorities estimate that these three changes will increase tax revenues by at least RUB 300 billion (around $6 billion) by 2025.
The authorities had repeatedly promised not to change the tax system before 2024 and are presenting the new law as the first change in many years.
In reality, the tax burden was gradually increasing all the time.
— The tax on the extraction of raw materials was steadily rising: initially for oil, then gas and condensate, and coal
— A tax on additional income has been levied on some oil fields since 2019, bringing in over RUB 700 billion ($8 billion)
— VAT was increased by two percentage points in 2019, from 18% to 20%; this added RUB 3.3 trillion ($37.7 billion) from 2019 to 2023.
— Property belonging to organizations began to be taxed at cadastral level
rather than at inventory level as previously; it’s impossible to calculate exactly what this has brought in, but it’s in the region of RUB 250 billion ($2.8 billion).
— In 2019, the self-employed began to be taxed. This affected people who previously had paid no tax, such as housekeepers, private tutors, rentiers and others. It didn’t bring in large amounts to the treasury, but it forced millions of people into the tax net.
It’s worth noting that over this period the Federal Taxation Service became much stricter about collecting tax. Tax collectors now hardly ever lose
a court case brought against businesspeople, meaning that they can increase the amount of tax demanded in any dispute.
Analysis
This creeping growth of taxes no longer covers the cost of the armed forces. Ever more money is needed for military spending since internal resources are melting away, sanctions are slowly but surely affecting budget revenues, and military production costs are on the increase. Spending on defence and security accounts for eight percent of GDP.
The tax reform has been presented as a fair redistribution of personal finances: high-earning citizens will pay a little more. But the biggest blow, as the Finance Ministry’s own earnings’ projections show, will fall on businesses.
Business people say they would be prepared to accept the new rules if the government would promise stability. But despite repeated requests, the Kremlin has refused to assure businesses that there will be no more sudden additional demands, such as last year’s excess profit tax.
It's worth pointing out, too, that by introducing a 25% profit tax Russia has become one of the highest tax-paying countries in the world. Inevitably, businesses pass new burdens of this kind on to the customer, which stokes inflation.
According to economic theory, raising taxes has a negative effect on a country’s growth and well-being, as opposed to debt-financing of the economy. Russia has one of the lowest public debt rates in the world – less than 15% of GDP. Yet instead of borrowing, the decision has been taken to increase the burden on businesses and on the population.
Some analysts attribute this approach by the authorities to the traumatic experience of 1998 when Russia defaulted on its sovereign debt and experienced a full-blown banking crisis.
Significance
There is a widespread view that the Russian political system is deaf to public opinion. Without genuine political parties and elections, there is no effective representative power. But it’s not deaf, and the tax reform approved in July actually underlines this.
There is a widespread view that the Russian political system is deaf to public opinion. Without genuine political parties and elections, there is no effective representative power. But it’s not deaf, and the tax reform approved in July actually underlines this.
The reality is that Russia’s authoritarian power depends heavily on public opinion surveys that are carried out systematically, sometimes behind the scenes. In 2004, poorly thought-through pension reform led to mass public anger and was quickly reversed.
Another pension reform proposed in 2018 was also badly received and led to
a drop in the overall level of trust in the authorities, and in Putin in particular. In the gubernatorial elections which followed, four of the Kremlin’s candidates were defeated – the first time such a thing had happened during Putin’s time in power.
The authorities have learned from these experiences. When preparing to raise taxes this time, they improved communications in an effort to address any negative reaction.
Putin mentioned the forthcoming tax changes towards the end of his long presidential address in February. He presented the plan in the most attractive way possible: it was essential to modernise the fiscal system and ‘divide the tax burden more fairly towards those who bring in higher personal and corporate earnings’; and, at the other end of the scale, reduce the weight of tax on families.
The authorities have avoided using the word ‘reform’, and details of the proposed tax changes emerged only in June.
Discussion of the plan in parliament was kept to the bare minimum.
The day before the law was passed the head of the relevant Duma committee, Andrei Makarov, and the analyst Viktor Nazarov (a supporter of the authorities) published press articles including lengthy justifications.
In place of the word ‘reform’, they used euphemisms such as ‘the perfection of the tax system’, ‘fine-tuning’, and ‘the equalisation of income inequality’.
The latest tax increases are part of a frantic effort to balance a budget which has been militarised in the extreme. The challenge for the authorities is to ensure that the people don’t see that the cost of the war is on their shoulders. This has required a special operation to hide the truth.
The Theatre Case: six years in a penal colony as a performance act
The Russian authorities have created their own Theatre of the Absurd
Event
— On 8 July a military court found theatre director Evgenia Berkovich and playwright Svetlana Petriychuk guilty of ‘justifying terrorism’. It sentenced them both to six years in a penal colony.
— Criminal charges were brought because of the theme of their 2021 production ‘Finist, the Brave Falcon’. The play portrayed interrogations of women who were tried and convicted of ‘aiding and abetting terrorism’. These women
had met Muslim men online and travelled to meet them in Syria, unaware that their Internet lovers were members of ISIS.
— In 2022, ‘Finist, the Brave Falcon’ won two prestigious Golden Mask prizes (a Russian national theatre award), in the ‘Best Playwright’ and
‘Best Costume Design’ categories.
Details
Evgenia Berkovich studied under the director, Kirill Serebrennikov,
who was at the centre of another theatrical scandal, ‘the Seventh Studio affair’, six years before the charges against Berkovich and Petriychuk.
During the time between these two events, Russian theatre has been brought steadily under state control; and since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it’s as if the censors have been tightening the screws not just by hand but with a pneumatic drill.
In the mildest cases, if the author or director has shown themselves to be opposed to the war, their names have been left off the posters; but in the worst cases – and this is what has happened most often – the show has been abruptly dropped from the theatre repertoire.
A principal theatre director is expected now to be not only a loyal member of the artistic community, but an outspoken, active supporter of Putin and the ‘special military operation’.
Analysis
Initially, the Kremlin appeared very cautious towards members of the artistic community who weren’t inclined to support the ‘big’ war that Putin started in February 2022. They were gently pushed out of the limelight and carefully silenced. But once the authorities understood that the public wasn’t going to protest, they introduced much harsher measures: artists were banned from carrying out their profession or hounded out of the country; next came court cases and sentences passed in absentia.
As before, society raised no objections; one could say that ensuring the loyalty of the theatre has become an important project for the Kremlin. It was started and is led by Sergei Novikov, the head of the directorate of social projects in the presidential administration. He draws up blacklists, not only of theatre personnel, but of any members of the artistic community he considers unfit to work in Russia. In his spare time Novikov is also a theatre director, and he’s put on a number of operas.
These two cases – Serebrennikov’s and Berkovich and Petriychuk’s – highlight not only how cruel the repressions have become, but also the degradation of society and, in particular, the theatre community. If numerous well-known members of the artistic community spoke out in support of Serebrennikov
in 2017, including the leaders of the Union of Theatre Workers, very few fellow theatre workers or human rights’ activists have publicly backed Berkovich and Petriychuk.
A letter published in May 2023 by Nobel Laureate Dmitry Muratov in support of Berkovich and Petriychuk, entitled ‘Go after the murderers, not the poets’, was signed by more than 10,000 people. And Amnesty International gathered more than 40,000 signatures on a petition calling for the pair to be released.
That was one side. On the other, the ‘guardians of culture’ changed the leadership of the Golden Mask committee and the whole premise of the prize. Without a shadow of doubt, this was because of the ‘criminal play’, ‘Finist, the Brave Falcon’.
There’s no longer any free discussion in the committee; and now the winners of the Golden Mask are determined by what the state commands.
Significance
There are a few theories about why Berkovich and Petriychuk fell under the steamroller of political repression.
— Evgenia Berkovich’s anti-war poems: these were distributed far and wide, rather like samizdat in Soviet times. [ ‘Samizdat’ literally means ‘self-published’. In the USSR, literature which was not approved by the Communist Party was frequently passed from hand to hand either in hand-written form or on tapes.] What’s more, Berkovich is not only a talented poet, but is the granddaughter of a human rights’ defender from the Soviet era, the writer Nina Katerli.
— Antisemitism: The Russian Jewish Congress believes that Berkovich’s professional ability was regarded with bitter envy by believers in nationalist conspiracy theories and that her conviction is a clear case of antisemitism.
— The political situation: the case was initiated following a denunciation that appeared to emanate from the theatre world, possibly sparked by envy
and the artistic impotency of ‘patriotic’ art. This became an attempt to show that the battle against terrorism and extremism was also being waged there, notably after the terrorist act in Moscow’s Crocus City Hall and the attacks in Dagestan earlier this year.
Russia’s Asian diplomacy is becoming more complicated
The Shanghai Cooperation Summit and the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow
Event
— President Putin took part in the Annual Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held in Astana on 3-4 July.
— The summit admitted Belarus as its tenth member.
— The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not attend the summit. Instead, he went to Moscow on his first trip abroad since his re-election. Moscow saw the visit as a diplomatic triumph.
— Putin and Modi hadn’t met since September 2022. It was Modi’s first visit to Moscow since 2019, when he was the principal guest at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok.
Details
The SCO has significantly expanded its place in the world. It started formally with six members in 2001: China, Russia and four Central Asian countries [Turkmenistan is not a member]. Seven years ago, India and Pakistan joined, despite the friction in relations between the two countries. Iran joined two years ago, after the start of the war in Ukraine. Belarus has become the first European country to join.
The summit focused on the need for member states to counter terrorism, separatism and extremism, as well as organised crime. These issues had a special relevance for Moscow after the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow in April that killed 145 people and injured more than 500.
Afghanistan was also high on the summit agenda because of concerns about its continuing instability.
With tensions in China-India relations still apparent after the Himalayan border clash in 2020 that killed at least 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers, Modi’s decision to skip the summit was not a surprise.
As the SCO is chaired by China, India has been ever less active. However, the announcement that Modi would make Russia his first destination after re-election was unexpected.
Putin belatedly presented Modi with the Order of St Andrew, Russia’s highest civilian honour, for his contribution to building the strategic partnership between India and Russia. It was originally awarded to him in 2019. China’s President Xi Jinping received the same award in 2017.
Analysis
Moscow’s relations with Asia are becoming increasingly complex as China and India pursue their global ambitions.
The SCO Summit was a reminder that China is the stronger player in Central Asia and that new patterns of relations are emerging that weaken Russia’s position in the region.
China is the driving force behind the SCO and has encouraged its expansion
from the original format of China, Russia and four Central Asian countries. In addition to the current ten full members, Mongolia and Afghanistan are observer members and there are 14 dialogue partners including Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Turkey.
Some Central Asian countries are unhappy about China’s decision to broaden the SCO’s membership because it has shifted the focus to the newer members. The smaller SCO was a useful forum for the Central Asian countries in which to balance their relations with Russia and China, maximising their sovereignty and independence by playing one off against the other.
Initially Moscow wasn’t interested in the SCO; but now sees it as a way of increasing international support for its anti-western agenda. The organisation’s expanded format is useful for this purpose.
The full-scale war in Ukraine is changing the regional balance of power. Moscow’s economic dependency on China is growing because of sanctions. On the one hand, China does not make life easy for Russia: cross-border trade is complicated by a shortage of yuan on the part of Russian importers, with a refusal at times to carry out any transactions, and by logistical difficulties.
On the other hand, China is making significant investments in the Central Asian countries, notably in transportation infrastructure. Once this is ready it will allow China to conduct trade flows which bypass the Russian Federation. This will further increase China’s influence as a regional partner, at Russia’s expense.
China is increasingly seen in Central Asia as the guarantor of regional security. Last year at the ‘China-Central Asia Summit’, the Chairman of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, offered the Central Asian leaders China’s assistance on internal security and national defence. This was previously Russia’s prerogative.
Modi’s visit showed the boldness of India’s diplomacy. After Putin’s state visit to China in May, it signalled to Beijing that India was positioning itself as an important partner of Russia. It was also a message to Washington that New Delhi believes it can have close relations with both the US and Russia.
For its part, Moscow had an interest in using the visit to reduce perceptions that its Asian diplomacy is becoming overly dependent on China because of the war in Ukraine.
As far as relations between Russia and India are concerned, there are signs
of stagnation in recent years. Economically, India is taking advantage of the sanctions imposed on Russia. India has become one of the major purchasers of Russian oil, at the same time continuing long-standing purchases, specifically coal and fertilisers. As Russian arms sales are gradually decreasing, Modi is betting on the production in India of licensed Western arms.
India neither supports Russia’s actions in Ukraine, nor does it condemn them. Its goal is to maintain economic relations with Russia to prevent Russia’s overdependence on China. Maintaining the possibility of having some influence on Russian decision-making is seen as a way of competing with China and not allowing China to infringe upon Indian interests.
Modi is clearly keeping his options open. In late August, he is scheduled to visit Kyiv.
Significance
Russia’s isolation from the West is influencing the dynamics of its relations
in Central Asia and complicating its long-standing ties in the region. Russia has used – and continues to try to use – these ties as a way of getting round sanctions. But this policy is far from successful. Turkey has a pan-Turkism programme, which it is also using to increase its role in Central Asia. This is, naturally, at Russia’s expense, even if Turkey can’t match China’s economic muscle.
China has good reason to prevent Russia becoming over-dependent on it economically because of the risk that China will end up paying to prop up its neighbour. For now though, there is no sign that Beijing sees the need to encourage Putin to change course. Its calculation appears to be that Chinese interests are served by Moscow continuing to challenge western security interests in Europe and testing the resolve of the US to stand by its allies.
In these circumstances, Russia is losing its dominant role in the region.
This has been underway for at least a decade but is accelerating because of the war in Ukraine.
Instead of Central Asia being a zone of special influence for Russia, it has become a hidden source of tension, including between those ‘closest friends’, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. Russia’s intensification of its ties with North Korea are almost certainly complicating its ties with China (see last month’s issue for coverage of Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in June).
Sergei Lavrov addresses the Global South and the Middle East
Western countries stopped listening to the Russian foreign minister long ago because of his lies. But Lavrov doesn’t care. He’s talking to another audience
Event
On 16-17 July the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, chaired two ministerial ‘open debates’, events that were part of Russia’s presidency of the UN Security Council.
— The first was on ‘multilateral cooperation in the interest of a more just, democratic and sustainable world order’. Its goal was to serve as a brainstorming session ahead of the UN’s Summit of the Future, due to take place in September. The goal of the summit is to involve hundreds of world leaders, policymakers and others in re-thinking the meaning of multilateralism in a rapidly
changing world.
— The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not attend the summit. Instead, he went to Moscow on his first trip abroad since his re-election. Moscow saw the visit as a diplomatic triumph.
— The second ‘open debate’ was on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question.
Details
Lavrov’s remarks were aimed at the countries that Moscow likes to call the ‘global majority’. His anti-American and anti-western rhetoric was along familiar lines, part of Russia’s continued effort to consolidate the non-western world around the idea that the international system is unjustly dominated by western countries and requires ‘democratisation’ to reflect the interests of others.
Lavrov was Russia’s ambassador to the UN for ten years (1994-2004), so feels totally at home there. The UN is a valuable venue because it allows Russia’s diplomats to communicate simultaneously to its audiences in Africa, Latin America, and south-east Asia that harbour grievances towards the West – often in the presence of western representatives.
Analysis
The Kremlin is capitalising on what it regards as recent positive trends
in global politics. It believes it is winning the war in Ukraine and that relations between Kyiv and the West are becoming more difficult as the West fails to provide Ukraine with what it needs to sustain the war effort.
It has persuaded itself that NATO’s bark is worse than its bite because of increasing isolationist trends in the US. NATO may have enlarged to include Finland and Sweden because of Putin’s war on Ukraine, yet viewed from the Kremlin, this may amount to little if the US no longer has the same commitment to the defence of Europe.
Moscow also detects weakening of governments in several European countries, as political forces that were considered either far right or far left see the opportunity to disrupt the established consensus and challenge orthodox thinking about Russia.
Lavrov’s press conference after the debates revealed more than his official speeches about the goal of his visit to New York.
For example, responding to a question about Ukraine, he used the opportunity to present Moscow’s deeply misleading perspective on the question of Ukraine’s borders. According to Lavrov:
- In February 2014 President Viktor Yanukovych signed an agreement with the opposition which, had it been carried out, would have led to a government of national unity and preparations for early presidential elections. Had this been followed through, today Ukraine would still have the same borders which it had in 1991.
- It was impossible for Ukraine to keep the borders which it had in 1991, because there was a referendum on Crimea joining the Russian Federation. Had the Minsk Agreements been honoured, Ukraine would still have its 1991 borders, minus Crimea.
- Had the agreement which the Russian and Ukrainian delegations reached
in April 2022 been signed, Ukraine would have its 1991 borders, minus Crimea and those territories which at that time were controlled by Russian forces. - Four regions –Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia – held ‘referendums’ and became part of Russia. This has been enshrined in the Russian constitution and is no longer open for discussion. Not all these regions have been ‘liberated’; but Russia cannot leave people who have voted to return their territory to Russia under the yoke of a regime which eradicates anything Russian.
Western diplomats and experts have no problem unpicking these arguments because they contain such obvious holes:
- Yanukovych was toppled after Russia forced him not to sign an Association Agreement with the EU that would have brought Ukraine closer to Europe. There is, in any case, no guarantee that Russia would not have intervened militarily in Ukraine even if a government of national unity had been formed in 2014. The Crimean referendum was illegal and held in conditions that were not democratic.
- The Minsk Agreements dictated by Russia were so badly written that they
could not be implemented. Russia’s direct support for the establishment
of ‘separatist regimes’ made it impossible for Ukraine to restore its sovereignty over those territories. - It is far from clear that an agreement was reached in April 2022 that could have ended the war. From what is known, the issue of borders needed to be decided at presidential level. There was also no agreed understanding on the size of the Ukrainian Army and what sort of security guarantees Ukraine would receive. Moscow reportedly wanted a veto over them.
- Finally, not only were the ‘referendums’ in the occupied parts of the four regions of Ukraine held in non-democratic conditions, those who ‘voted’ did not do so on behalf of the displaced population or those living in parts of those regions that were not occupied.
However, for countries that distrust the West and are attracted by Russia’s anti-western narratives, its version of the war in Ukraine and the presentation of Russia as a victim of aggression can appear plausible.
Lavrov reinforced his message by using the debate on the situation in the Middle East to point out the inconsistencies of US policy towards the region and the failure of the US and Israel to observe UN Security Council resolutions in addressing the current situation in Gaza. He drew a direct parallel with Ukraine, accusing the US of being a direct party to the conflict there and in Gaza.
His audience on this occasion was the Gulf states. Lavrov suggested that these countries could become a force for peace in the region if they can normalise relations between themselves. Notably, both Saudi Arabia and UAE, Washington’s closest allies in the region, are fast developing relations with China and have not aligned themselves with the US over Ukraine and Taiwan.
Significance
Russian diplomacy has an audience among countries where there are strong anti-western sentiments. To exploit these, it uses simple messages that its audience has no need to question. It appeals to emotion over reason. Western countries find it hard to counter this approach because they must do the reverse.
For the Russian audience, Lavrov showed that Russia holds significant authority on the global stage. He reinforced the message that the West has lost moral authority and that Russia is not isolated.
News in brief
Ukrainian foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, visited China 23-26 July, at the invitation of the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Li. It was the first visit to China by a Ukrainian official since the start of the war.
Comment
- The visit took place in Guangzhou, not in Beijing, which was an effort to downplay its significance.
- According to Kuleba, Wang Li told him that China confirmed the inviolability of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its borders as they were in 1991. This is not a new policy for China, but its confirmation is important for Kyiv.
- President Zelensky said that Kuleba had received a guarantee from the Chinese leadership that it would not supply arms to Russia. Information has emerged that China has been delivering weapons to Russia. Wang’s statement may indicate that China intends to stop these supplies.
- China continues to position itself as a party seeking peace in Ukraine.
It either lacks the capacity to influence Russia or it has an interest
in the continuation of the war.
President Joe Biden’s decision to drop out of the presidential race and his replacement by Kamala Harris creates uncertainty
for Moscow too.
Comment
- The Kremlin was prepared for two old men: one whose judgement appeared to be fading, the other who is business-like and is fond of autocratic methods of governance. Instead, they might now have to deal with an energetic and principled lawyer who is relatively inexperienced in international affairs and may not observe the various subtleties that characterise Biden’s approach.
- Putin stated in February that Biden was more predictable. There is good reason to believe that the Kremlin is nervous about a second Trump term. His first term did not bring what Moscow had hoped for and there is a danger that Moscow’s closer relations with China could become a source of irritation for Trump in view of the likelihood that his foreign policy will focus on countering Chinese influence.
- Moscow knows that Trump will not be able to find a quick solution to ending the war in Ukraine. Like everyone else, it is looking for clues to see who Trump’s foreign policy team might be.
Based in London, the New Eurasian Strategies Centre brings together the best expertise on Russia and the surrounding region. Its mission is to identify the forces shaping Russia’s long-term future, to analyse their impact and to develop strategies to bring about peaceful and positive development of the country.
This edition was prepared with contributions by Kirill Kharatyan, John Lough, Vladimir Pastukhov and Nikolai Petrov