June 2024: Russia at a Glance
New Eurasian Strategies Centre Bulletin
Index
The St. Petersburg Economic Forum: The Heirs of the Elite Take to the Stage
A generation of ‘children’ is coming to the forefront of Russian politics. Their introduction was a highlight of Putin’s most important forum. What insights did this event reveal?
Changes in Power after the ‘Election’: Rejuvenation, yet Weakness
After his ‘re-election’, Vladimir Putin carried out a reshuffle of his officials. However, despite his dictatorial status, his freedom to manoeuvre is significantly restricted, leading to a reduction in the effectiveness of the vertical of power.
Vladimir Putin has radically replaced the civilian leadership of the Ministry of Defence, significantly weakening the department. The new minister, Andrei Belousov, now has to create his own system for running it and coordination with the military-industrial complex, as well as with the Security Council, where Sergei Shoigu has joined Patrushev’s team. How might this affect the Russian military system?
Putin’s Visit to North Korea: At Last He’s Found a Genuine Ally
The two dictators created a formal basis for terrorising the whole world, but it’s more than likely that most of their declarations will remain on paper. The risk is too great that they would seriously anger significant countries and rather than bring any benefits, the consequences would be disproportionately severe.
The St. Petersburg Economic Forum: The Heirs of the Elite Take to the Stage
What was memorable about ‘the main business event of the year’ which Putin took part in?
Event
The St. Petersburg International Economic Forum took place from 5 to 8 June. The organisers emphasised the word ‘international’ and proudly announced:
- 139 countries took part in the Forum, the guest-of-honour being the Sultanate of Oman
- More than 480 companies from 94 countries and territories were represented
- 1,073 agreements were signed, totalling $70 billion (6.5 trillion rubles), of which 55 were with foreign companies – rather modestly, this total was not revealed
Details
Despite the organisers’ claims, the reality was somewhat different:
- Oman, the guest-of-honour, was represented by its Minister of Industry, Trade and Investment. However, no information was given as to any agreements signed with business from Oman
- Only two heads of state participated: the presidents of Bolivia and Zimbabwe. There were also two heads of so-called states, the president of the unrecognised territory of Abkhazia and the president of the Republic Srpska, part of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- 90% of the agreements signed at the Forum were direct money transfers, signed with the participation of representatives from various levels of the Russian government and state-run companies
Overall, the principal purpose of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum was always to show the healthy state of the Russian economy, and its bright future prospects, which is especially significant in current circumstances. But this time the Forum also became a platform to show off the next generation of relatives and those close to Putin and his entourage: it was the first time this had been done so publicly.
The biggest sensation of the 2024 Forum was that both of Putin’s daughters appeared.
- Maria Vorontsova, a member of the Presidium of the Russian Association for the Promotion of Science and a member of the Council for the Implementation of the Federal Scientific and Technical Programme for the Development of Genetic Technology
- Katerina Tikhonova, the Director-General of the Innopraktika company, and co-chair of the Coordinating Council of the Russian Union of Entrepreneurs and Industrialists for Import Substitution and Technological Independence. She also appeared at the Forum in 2021
Other less well-known children of the elite who appeared at the Forum were:
- Alexander Vayno, leader of the youth centre of the Agency for Strategic Initiatives; son of Anton Vayno, Head of the Kremlin Administration
- Ksenia Shoigu, leader of the League of Heroes project; daughter of Sergei Shoigu, the former Defence Minister, now Secretary of the Security Council
Additionally, children of the elite who participated in the personnel changes made after the so-called presidential election were also present:
- Dmitry Patrushev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Government; son of Nikolai Patrushev, former Secretary of the Security Council, now Putin’s aide for ship-building
- Boris Kovalchuk, Chairman of the Accounts Chamber of Russia; son of Putin’s friend, Yury Kovalchuk, owner of the Rossiya Bank
- Anna Tsivileva, a Deputy Defence Minister; Putin’s niece
Analysis
This parade of the next generation of Putin’s elite at the Forum was not so much a demonstration of strength as of the weakness of the autocratic system. These youngsters certainly did not appear in any way to be suitable replacements for their fathers’ generation.
This was a strong reminder of what has happened in Chechnya, where the young children of ‘the sultan’, Ramzan Kadyrov, have been given senior posts in ‘the republic.
There is also an example of this happening in reverse: Andrei Turchak, the son of Putin’s friend, Anatoly Turchak, has been removed from the heights of Putin’s hierarchy. He was Secretary of the General Council of the ruling party, United Russia, and First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council, and has now been sent as the Governor to Russia’s poorest region, the Altai Republic.
Forecast
On the one hand, transferring power to the next generation, some of which has already been done, is clearly a part of the Kremlin’s strategy, and so the appearance of the heirs was the most important part of the Forum.
On the other hand, the heirs are shown to be closely tied to their families, which is a way of demonstrating their fathers political significance and a way of keeping them hostage: if they step out of line, their children’s careers will also be destroyed.
Changes in Power after the ‘Election’: Rejuvenation, yet Weakness
A vicious circle: the system depends on Putin, yet Putin cannot break the balance in the system
Event
After Vladimir Putin’s ‘re-election’ a reshuffle and new appointments in all branches of power took place. This occurred in the government, the regions and the presidential administration; in the parliamentary Accounts Chamber; and also in the Supreme Court, although this last due to natural causes.
It’s worth talking about a whole host of new appointments: more than 20 people changed their positions. Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine or even from the time of the pandemic, Putin had started to delay personnel changes, even to the point of failing to fill vacant posts. The election passed served as a focal point for a reshuffle and rejuvenation: the next ‘generation of the children’ have been brought into positions of power.
See above, ‘The St. Petersburg Economic Forum: The Heirs of the Elite Take to the Stage’
Long-awaited appointments were made to vacant posts:
- Boris Kovalchuk now heads the Accounts Chamber a year and a half after Alexei Kudrin stepped down
- Valery Pikalev is the head of the Federal Customs Service more than a year after Vladimir Bulavin left the post
New people have been placed in corrupt positions in the Defence Ministry, following the arrival of the new minister, Andrei Belousov.
Details
A good half of the new appointees are relatives of Putin’s comrades, of Putin himself, or of his former aides:
- Anna Tsivileva, née Putina (Putin’s niece); a Deputy Defence Minister; her husband, Sergei Tsivliev, is Energy Minister
- Boris Kovalchuk, son of Yury Kovalchuk, Putin’s friend and his banker; a Chairman of the Accounts Chamber of Russia
- Dmitry Patrushev, son of Nikolai Patrushev, Putin’s confidante; a Deputy Chairman of the Russian Government
- Pavel Fradkov, son of Mikhail Fradkov, the former Prime Minister and Director of the External Intelligence Service; a Deputy Defence Minister
- Andrei Turchak, son of Anatoly Turchak, Putin’s former deputy in the St. Petersburg branch of the Our Home is Russia party [Nash dom – Rossiya], the forerunner of the United Russia party; the Governor of the Altai Republic
- Alexei Dyumin, Putin’s aide, and Valery Pikalev, Director of the Federal Customs Service, both former bodyguards of Putin.
Analysis
None of the major players in the leadership were strengthened by the reshuffle. The Chairman of the government, Mikhail Mishustin, who, according to the Constitution would become acting president should Putin become incapacitated, held onto his post and retained his team, but was given a powerful counterweight in the person of the new Defence Minister, Andrei Belousov. Even though Belousov’s former position as First Deputy Chairman of the Government was formally a more senior post, given the war he has not been downgraded at all. It is in the Defence Ministry that the most radical changes have taken place. It has become virtually a government within the government.
See below, ‘The Reshuffle of the Leadership: Initial Results’
The career path of the new appointees does not indicate a change in their tasks but shows an increase in their status. This applies to the First Deputy Chairman of the Government, Denis Manturov, Deputy Chairmen Dmitry Patrushev and Vitaly Savelyev, and the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Maxim Oreshkin. Deputy Chairman of the Government, Alexander Novak, has apparently been strengthened by taking on the economic tasks previously held by Andrei Belousov, but in wartime conditions this is merely a technical detail.
In the presidential administration, presidential aide Nikolai Patrushev was formally demoted, but in reality, his new role of ensuring Russia’s mastery over the seas gives him significant financial resources and a serious position. Another presidential aide, Alexei Dyumin, clearly has too much authority, yet is barely independent. And after his departure from the Defence Ministry, the Secretary of the Security Council, Sergei Shoigu, has lost a huge part of his resources and his team.
Forecast
Putin's personnel system has run out of resources and relies only on people who can be completely trusted and are personally wholly dependent on Putin, which makes them less effective.
The dependence at the core of the system, with its clear duplication of certain functions and obvious subordination associated with the new appointments, simplifies the passing on of orders, but deprives Putin of quality feedback.
Such a system will inevitably become less efficient, power will become ever more de-institutionalized, and the quality of operational decisions will deteriorate.
The Reshuffle of the Leadership: Initial Results
It’s the Crayfish, the Pike and the Swan in the Defence – with an Eye on the long Term
Event
In May and June, the leadership of the Defence Ministry changed significantly. In came the new minister, Andrei Belousov, and four out of eleven deputies: Leonid Gornin, formerly the First Deputy Finance Minister, became First Deputy Defence Minister, with responsibility for military expenditure; and Deputy Ministers Oleg Savelyev, ex-Minister for Economic Development for Crimea, Pavel Fradkov, ex-Deputy Chairman of the Presidential Administration, and Anna Tsivileva, Putin’s niece.
In the Security Council, a body with extremely vague powers, Sergei Shoigu replaced Nikolai Patrushev as Secretary.
Details
The purge of the top brass of the Defence Ministry came in the wake of high-profile corruption scandals: a number of senior military officials have ended up behind bars, among them the Deputy Defence Minister, Timur Ivanov.
Analysis
The model of changing radically the leadership of an institution has been actively employed since 2012, and it was the Defence Ministry which set the pattern with the dismissal of the then Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. The model works as follows. One of those close to the head of the organisation is detained, and their testimony then becomes the reason for the resignation of the person at the top. After the top person has resigned, their whole team across a number of bureaucratic levels below them is then replaced.
As well as the Defence Ministry, this model has been applied to others in the power structure:
- Beginning in 2016, there was a clear-out of the leadership of the Internal Troops (now Rosgvardiya, the National Guard). Once Putin’s personal bodyguard, Viktor Zolotov, took over, the previous leadership was removed en masse.
- In 2022, the replacement of one of Putin’s personal bodyguards by another in the Emergency Situations Ministry was followed by the removal of the old staff.
There is nothing personal in this: it is simply that the civilian apparatus of the Defence Ministry is no longer Shoigu’s team and has been taken into a unified pyramid of power. On the one hand, this strengthens the Kremlin’s control over it. On the other hand, it weakens the organisation’s political representation.
However effective or otherwise they may prove to be in the future, significant changes of personnel cause these newcomers at least temporarily to concentrate on themselves, thus lowering their effectiveness
The appointment of Andrei Belousov has been interpreted as an indication that there is going to be a long military standoff with the West. Belousov is known to be a loner, who does not take his team with him when he moves from one post to another. However, Oleg Savelyev has been made his deputy and a Supervisor of the Apparatus of the Ministry of Defence. This is someone he knows well, as Savelyev was his deputy in the Ministry for Economic Development. And in recent years, Savelyev has been involved in the Accounts Chamber, tasked with auditing the power structure. Under Saveliev, the Apparatus has become the administrative body of the entire ministry, not just the minister, as it was under Shoigu, meaning its powers have expanded. As a result, his personal influence has increased.
For quasi checks and balances, supervised by Putin, Belousov has been allocated Anna Tsivileva and Pavel Fradkov, the son of one of Putin’s previous prime ministers and a career secret service (FSB) officer. Apparently, Tsivileva will combine her official activity with work in Putin’s ‘Defender of the Fatherland’ Foundation. This pays out enormous sums of money to support ‘veterans’ of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and to the relatives of those who have been killed in the war.
Belousov has begun his new role actively and has radically increased his participation in public events. He has accompanied Putin on foreign visits; held a meeting with military correspondents to gauge public opinion; held a meeting on the provision of drones to the armed forces; inspected military bases in Moscow and the Primorsky region, a Russian coastal territory in the Far East, bordering North Korea; and spoken by phone with the US Defence Secretary, Lloyd Austin. Belousov has also been made Chairman of the Council of Defence Ministers of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Unlike Belousov, Shoigu previously moved from one post to another and took his team with him. On this occasion, however, he has not been permitted to take any of his team to the Security Council. The only new appointment in the Security Council, the Deputy Secretary, Grigory Molchanov, who previously headed the Defence Ministry’s Military Academy for Intelligence Officers, has no direct connection with Shoigu.
The leadership of the Security Council has remained solidly the team that served under Patrushev. Shoigu is an outsider, virtually as Dmitry Medvedev was when he was appointed to the post in 2020 from that of prime minister.
Whoever occupies it, the post of Secretary of the Security Council has serious political weight – but nothing else. Not only has Shoigu lost financial and administrative influence and the cachet of being at the head of one of the power ministries, he has also been relieved of the massive propagandist resource given to him by his TV channel, seven major publications and his multifaceted press service. His presence in the media has fallen dramatically as a result.
Forecast
It is far from clear that the effectiveness of the war machine will be improved under Belousov’s direction. Unlike Shoigu, Belousov is an office manager, who has no experience of running major enterprises or complicated projects. However, from his time in government, he has excellent knowledge of the country’s economic capabilities as well as the financial sector itself.
Something else which is likely to make this task more difficult is that Belousov is not the only official responsible for the military-industrial complex. There is also the First Deputy Chairman of the government, Denis Manturov; the head of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Anton Alikhanov; the Deputy Chairman of the Commission on military-industrial complex, Sergei Shoigu; presidential aide Alexei Dyumin; and the heavyweight Nikolai Patrushev as overseer of naval ship-building and naval strategy.
Putin’s Visit to North Korea: At Last He’s Found a Genuine Ally
The greatest difficulty in the relationship between the two dictators is that nobody around the world likes the idea of a rapprochement between the two men
Event
Vladimir Putin visited North Korea on 18 and 19 June. Over the course of less than two days, Putin spent 11 hours in talks with the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un. The main result of the talks was the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement. Article 4 of the Agreement states that the Russian Federation and North Korea will come to the aid of each other in the event of an attack, which is similar in tone to Article 5 of the NATO document.
Putin appeared genuinely touched by the warmth of his reception: ‘I didn’t expect this’, he said. This was presumably exactly what Kim intended. He spent two hours in the airport awaiting Putin’s arrival, because the Russian leader was late.
A whole host of agreements of intent were signed as well as a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement, but the only ones to be made public were what might be termed ‘humanitarian documents’, which look to increase educational, tourist and sporting contacts, among others.
Details
Despite the warmth of this meeting of the dictators, Kim did not accord Putin the highest state reception. The Russian leader was allowed to write an article for the main North Korean newspaper, Rodong Sinmun. This was an honour, undoubtedly, but not the greatest that could have been given. He was not described in the most lavishly respectful language, as had been addressed to Mao Zedong in the 1970s and Xi Jinping in 2018. Readers of the newspaper will have understood that in his relationship with Putin, Kim is considered the senior partner and Putin the junior.
Analysis
After his visit to North Korea, Putin travelled to Vietnam, where he gave vent to his annoyance. He pledged to provide North Korea with high-precision weapons as response to western arms deliveries to Ukraine and stated that he was not interested in where these weapons ended up. Given that North Korea has close ties with Iran, Putin was signalling to the US and its allies that he did not care if these weapons fell into the hands of the Houthis, Hamas or other terrorist groups.
Putin also delivered a further threat to western countries saying that Russia is reviewing its nuclear doctrine and implying that it might drop the threshold for nuclear use.
The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement can be seen as a violation of the United Nations’ sanctions against North Korea – sanctions which the Russian Federation itself approved. Article 16 of the Russian-North Korean agreement states:
The parties oppose the use of unilateral coercive measures … and consider their introduction illegal and contradictory to the UN Charter
But the UN sanctions are by their very nature ‘unilateral coercive measures’.
The rapprochement between Kim and Putin, especially such a clear one, has struck a blow not only to relations with the international community. There is no doubt that it is also a source of concern for China, North Korea’s main patron. It is unlikely that Beijing will take any measures against North Korea, but the warming of Pyongyang’s ties with Moscow potentially creates new problems for China in its relations with the West.
South Korea has made no attempt to hide its irritation. Its threat to send weapons to Ukraine may be difficult to implement because of its official policy not to arm countries at war. Seoul has so far only supplied military equipment and humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
Forecast
North Korea is likely to send to Russia armaments, shells, workers and possibly even soldiers, or engineer units, at least. The presence in the Russian delegation of the Deputy Defence Minister responsible for Armaments, Alexei Krivoruchko, and three senior officials from the transport sphere – Deputy Chairman of the Government, Vitaly Savelyev; Transport Minister, Roman Starovoyt; and the Director of Russian Railways, Oleg Belozerov – indicated that Pyongyang will be increasing its exports to Russia.
See above, ‘The Reshuffle of The Leadership: Initial Results’
Might Putin in return supply North Korea with the missile technology and fissile material technology that it so desperately needs? If he were to do so, he would run the risk of ruining relations with South Korea are huge; and Seoul holds an arsenal that is no smaller and possibly even larger than North Korea’s. In addition, the South Korean Army is already upgrading its equipment, which would allow Seoul to part very easily with its older equipment and shells – both are currently desperately needed by Ukraine.
Russia is clearly trying to walk a narrow path. Loud declarations have been made, and those who have chosen to be frightened by this have been; but Putin is under no obligation to put these declared intentions into practice. It is not only South Korea that is watching carefully Putin’s relationship with North Korea. The US is following developments closely and, most significantly, so is China. And Putin certainly cannot afford to spoil Russia’s relations with the last one.
Based in London, the New Eurasian Strategies Centre brings together the best expertise on Russia and the surrounding region. Its mission is to identify the forces shaping Russia’s long-term future, to analyse their impact and to develop strategies to bring about peaceful and positive development of the country.
This edition was prepared with contributions by Kirill Kharatyan, John Lough, Vladimir Pastukhov and Nikolai Petrov